Conservation Through Cooperation: The Collaborative Planning Process for Utility Conservation and Load Management by van Hook, Evan
Note
Conservation Through Cooperation:
The Collaborative Planning Process for Utility
Conservation and Load Management
Evan van Hook
The Collaborative Planning Process (CPP) is an experimental administra-
tive procedure that applies the principles of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR)' to the complex problem of utility conservation and load management
(C&LM). Despite its potential advantages, the CPP has been criticized as
politically illegitimate and too costly. In this Note I propose an organizing
statute for the CPP that addresses these concerns.
INTRODUCTION
Today, many disputes that were traditionally settled in adversarial proceed-
ings are being resolved through ADR procedures.2 In many ADR procedures,
rather than delegate decisionmaking authority to a third party, the disputants
negotiate results and are bound only by agreements to which they consent.
1. ADR refers to a broad variety of procedures designed to allow parties to resolve disputes outside
of traditional litigation fora, to reduce the cost of conventional litigation, and to prevent disputes that might
otherwise become the subject of litigation. Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons Front the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 425-26 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
3. Daniel J. Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Policy Process, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 764, 768
(1988).
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The use of ADR has been particularly widespread in the resolution of
disputes over environmental matters.4 Environmental disputes are appropriate
for ADR because they often place in opposition two profoundly valid human
objectives: our desire to use, and our desire to preserve, the resources of our
natural world.5 The validity of both objectives makes us sympathetic to
resolving environmental disputes in fora that reach an accommodation or
compromise between them, rather than choosing one over the other.6
However, the potentially substantial impact of environmental dispute resolution
imposes a special responsibility to ensure that all affected interests are
represented,7 and that the public interest limits the scope of negotiated
settlements.
The proposed use of ADR to settle environmental disputes, therefore,
confronts a tension between society's desire to accommodate conflicting policy
goals, and the recognition that apparent consensus sometimes masks a failure
to account for all affected interests. ADR processes for resolving
environmental disputes must be structured to take account of this tension.
This Note examines one such ADR process, the CPP. The CPP is used to
resolve disputes between utility companies, which often seek to satisfy growing
energy demand by expanding energy production capacity, and conservationists,
who prefer to reduce energy demand or to increase the efficiency of energy
use. The CPP was developed through contractual agreements between the
participants, rather than through official guidance. This Note argues that, while
the CPP has the potential to be a superior method for planning C&LM
programs, an organizing statute to direct and constrain the CPP would ensure
its procedural integrity and increase its efficiency. The Note is based, in part,
on information obtained from interviews that the author conducted with CPP
participants throughout New England. Part I discusses the C&LM problems
4. See, e.g., Bryan M. Johnston & Paul J. Krupin, The 1989 Pacific Northwest 7imber Compromise:
An Environmental Dispute Resolution Case Study of a Successfid Battle That May Have Lost the lVar, 27
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 613, 623-24 (1991) (describing increasing use of mediation, negotiation, and
facilitation to resolve environmental disputes); Melanie J. Rowland, Bargaining for Life: Protecting
Biodiversity Through Mediated Agreements, 22 ENVTL. L. 503, 503 (1992) (discussing growing interest in
using mediation and negotiation to resolve environmental disputes); Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of
Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?, 10 COLuM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 3 (1985); see also
Eberhard Bohne, Recent Trends in Informal Envirotnmental Conflict Resolution, in KONFLIKTBEWAELTI-
GUNG DURCH VERHANGUNGEN 217 (Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem & Eberhard Abmann eds., 1990) (describing
use of informal agreements to resolve environmental disputes in Germany).
5. See Rowland, supra note 4, at 518-19. A recent example is the dispute over the protection of the
spotted owl in the American Northwest. This dispute was often described as a conflict between two
mutually exclusive goals, protecting jobs by exploiting the forest resources and protecting an endangered
species by preserving those same resources. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, 19 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,159, 21,161 (D. Or. 1989) (characterizing media coverage of spotted owl
controversy as "JOBS versus OWLS").
6. See, e.g., Rowland, supra note 4, at 504 (noting potential for shared knowledge and innovative
solutions).
7. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 4, at 19-22 (discussing need for appellate courts to scrutinize negotiated
environmental rules because all interests might not have been represented at negotiations).
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that the CPP was designed to address. Part II explains how the CPP works.8
Part III discuses the strengths and weaknesses of the CPP, and suggests
specific provisions for its organizing statute.
I. THE PROBLEM THAT THE CPP SEEKS TO ADDRESS
America wants its utilities to conserve energy. There are multiple
expressions in both state9 and federal' ° law of the principle that a kilowatt
saved is better than a kilowatt burned. This notion has even begun to shape our
relationships with other nations." Increased conservation is technologically
feasible because significant demand-side resources 2  are available to
American utilities. 3 Switching to efficient technologies could cut our energy
use by up to 75% without a significant change in either our lifestyle or GNP
growth.'
4
Conservation is preferable to capacity expansion for several reasons. The
consumer has no preference between a kilowatt obtained through conservation
8. Each negotiation group, or "collaborative," using the CPP has a unique, contractually-based format.
By looking at examples of existing collaboratives, however, we get a sense of how they operate.
9. See, e.g., CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 25008 (\Vest 1986 & Supp. 1992) ("It is ... the policy of the
state and the intent of the Legislature to promote all feasible means of energy conservation .... ); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 16a-35k (1988) ("[T]he general assembly declares that it is the policy of the state of
Connecticut to ... conserve energy resources by avoiding unnecessary and wasteful consumption ....");
GA. CODE ANN. § 46-4A-2 (1992) ("The General Assembly finds that the rising cost and uncertain supply
of energy resources require an active program of energy conservation assistance ...."); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3191 (Supp. 1991) ("When the available alternatives [for meeting energy capacity
requirements] are otherwise equivalent, the commission shall give preference first to conservation and
demand management ...."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216C.11 (West 1991) (creating energy conservation
information center).
10. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988) ("The Congress finds that the protection of the public health,
safety, and welfare, the preservation of national security, and the proper exercise of congressional authority
under the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce require ... a program providing for increased
conservation of electric energy [and] increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by electric
utilities"); 42 U.S.C. §§ 8211-8229 (1988) (National Energy Conservation Policy, Utility Program); 10
U.S.C.A. § 2865(b)(3)(A) (\vest Supp. 1992) (requiring Secretary of Army to encourage military to
participate in utility energy conservation programs).
11. See, e.g., Sam H. Verhovek, Cuomo, Citing Economic Issues, Cancels Quebec Power Contract,
N.Y. TIMFES, March 28, 1992, at 1 ("The Governor said that New York did not need the power and that
it would be cheaper to rely on energy conservation .... ).
12. Demand-side resources come from currently under-utilized opportunities to increase the efficiency
of energy service delivery. These opportunities become resources when programs are developed that allow
utilities to rely on them to an extent comparable to other energy sources. See 2 NATIONAL ASS'N OF
REGULATORY UTILITY COMM'Rs, THE DEMAND SIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 11-I
(1988) [hereinafter DEMAND SIDE].
13. The most common way for utilities to access these regources is through direct investment in
promoting efficient end-use products. See, e.g., Puget Power Launches "Operation Conservation," Bus.
Wire, June 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE file (reporting how Puget Power obtained
demand-side resources by supplying residential weatherization, high-efficiency shower heads, faucet
aerators, compact fluorescent lights, and appliance rebates to residential customers); Kraft to Get $2.6-
Million Rebate from Boston Edfor Conservation, INDUS. ENERGY BULL., April 27, 1990, at I (noting that
Boston Edison agreed to give rebates to Kraft for accelerated replacement of freon/ammonia refrigeration
with ammonia systems, installation of high-efficiency motors and better air-flow equipment, replacement
of electric defrost units with hot ammonia system, and installation of energy-efficient lighting and ballasts).
14. Arnold P. Fickett et al., Efficient Use of Electricity, Scl. AM., Sept. 1990, at 65, 66.
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and one generated through capacity expansion. 5 Capacity expansion,
however, increases pollution, 6 diminishes the recreational value of our public
lands,17 increases our dependence on foreign oil,' 8  and does less for
economic development than investment in conservation. 9
Despite the advantages of demand-side resources, economic and behavioral
barriers prevent both consumers and utilities from pursuing conservation
aggressively. Discovering appropriate conservation measures imposes high
information costs on consumers. 20 Also, because of "split economic incen-
tives," energy customers require recoupment of costs in as short as one month
before making investments in energy efficiency.
2'
Utilities resist conservation because, under traditional rate setting
procedures, it has an adverse effect on earnings.22 Utility directors may also
be afraid to experiment in ways that might result in power shortages, 23 or
15. See Ralph C. Cavanagh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric Utilities and Their
Regulators, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 315 (1986).
16. Electric utilities produce 70% of the sulphur dioxide and 33% of the nitric oxide emissions in
America, both of which are thought to be linked to acid rain; 20% of the gases linked to the greenhouse
effect; and 50% of the nation's nuclear waste. DAVID MOSKOVITZ, PROFITS AND PROGRESS THROUGH
LEAST-COST PLANNING 1 (1989).
17. See, e.g., Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. v. Board of Envti. Protection, 595 A.2d 438 (Me. 1991)
(upholding denial of certification of hydroelectric project for failure to show that it would not interfere with
fishing, recreation, and fish habitat).
18. The annual U.S. energy bill could be reduced by between 27 and 120 billion dollars through the
implementation of energy conservation measures. MOSKOVrrZ, supra note 16.
19. One dollar spent on conservation can produce up to four times as many on-site jobs as a dollar
invested in capacity expansion. See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 320. Also, new power plants require
billions of dollars in investments with a substantial risk of cancellation due to the failure of demand to
materialize. See, e.g., In re Washington Pub. Power Supply System See. Litig., 720 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Ariz.
1989) (noting that series of nuclear power plants with projected costs of $23.9 billion canceled after
demand for energy failed to materialize). For the role of energy demand in this fiasco, see Benjamin E.
Waiters & David F. Sugarman, Comment, WPPSS and the Pacific Northwest: A Mere Possibility of
Unravelling a Hopelessly Twisted Debt, 16 ENvTL. L. 91, 101-02 (1985). In contrast, demand-side
resources adjust automatically to fluctuations in demand. Since energy users reap these resources from
changing their behavior or the materials they use, any changes in the number of these users or in the
intensity of usage is automatically reflected in the demand-side resources available. Cavanagh, supra note
15, at 317.
20. See DEMAND SIDE, supra note 12, at 11-9.
21. Id. at 11-5. The "split incentives" derive from the fact that often the energy user is not the energy
purchaser, as in the case of a tenant whose apartment the landlord heats. Also, in our mobile society,
individuals may be reluctant to make long-term investments if they are uncertain that they will be
remaining in their present location. Id. at 1-9.
22. Utility rates are set to allow recovery of operating expenses and fixed costs. Once the rate is set,
a utility company can increase its profits by exceeding projected sales of energy. MOSKOVrrZ, supra note
16, at 3. See also Lori A. Burkhart, Revenue Erosion: Can Conservation Be Too Successful?, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Dec. 21, 1989, at 41.
The Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control has explicitly recognized the effect of conserva-
tion on utility earnings: "Under existing ratemaking practices, there is a direct relationship between the
volume of a utility's sales and its earnings level; all other things being equal, higher sales produce higher
earnings. Since conservation programs generally reduce sales, this sales-earnings link is a disincentive to
effective implementation of conservation programs." STATE OF CONN. DEP'T PUB. UTIL. CONTROL, REPORT
TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY: D.P.U.C. IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC ACT 91-248, Doe. No. 91-07-20, at ii
(Dec. 24, 1991) [hereinafter CDPUC REPORT] (emphasis removed).
23. Interview with Nancy Pitblado, Planning Analyst Supervisor, State of Connecticut Office of Policy
and Management, in Hartford, Conn. (March 17, 1992) [hereinafter Pitblado Interview]; see also
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they may fear loss of esteem in an industry that has always been defined by
sales.24 Despite the attractiveness of utility conservation, therefore, it is
unlikely to be pursued voluntarily.
Prior to the advent of the CPP, policies in favor of conservation were
enforced primarily by environmental activists intervening in utility rate cases
and claiming that the utility's investment in conservation was insufficient. The
issue of the appropriate level of utility conservation was resolved through
adversarial procedures, with the public utility commission acting as judge.2
This method of enforcing conservation policies was unsatisfactory. Effort and
resources which could have been devoted to solving C&LM problems were
instead consumed in litigation. In addition, resolving C&LM disputes diverted
the regulatory commissions' attention away from the other important issues
traditionally considered in utility rate proceedings.26 In his book Dynamos
and Virgins,7 David Roe chronicled one of the first of these cases, involving
the Environmental Defense Fund and the Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
Near the end of the book, a frustrated Roe asks whether a PG&E official could
"see any shortcut ... to the five years of litigious struggle .... Would it have
been possible to cooperate? ' '28
In 1987, the litigants in a rate case in Connecticut found an answer to
Roe's question. In response to an order issued by the Connecticut Department
of Public Utility Control (CDPUC),29 utility principals, CDPUC staff, and
Application of CL&P to Increase its Rates and Revenues, No. 85-10-22, 1986 Conn. PUC LEXIS 116, 192
(Conn. D.P.U.C. 1986) ("CL&P witnesses stated that they cannot guarantee the amount of demand which
is under their control.").
24. This is particularly true because utility management has been dominated by engineers, rather than
economists. Their focus has been on building, rather than on finding optimal economic solutions. Interview
with Wilson Gonzalez, Lead Planning Analyst, State of Connecticut Office of Policy and Management,
Energy Division, in Hartford, Conn. (March 17, 1992) [hereinafter Gonzalez Interview].
25. See, e.g., Re United Illuminating Co., No. 83-03-01,55 P.U.R.4th 252,271 (Conn. D.P.U.C. 1983)
("As noted by intervenors . . . . [s]everal recent public acts indicate a continued strong legislative
commitment to conservation .... Unfortunately, the company continues to believe conservation is a threat
rather than an opportunity."); Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 521 A.2d 482, 484 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1987) (intervenors in hearing consider question of conservation as alternative to construction
of nuclear power plant); Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 589 A.2d 38 (Me. 1991)
(intervenors successfully obtain denial of certification of hydro-electric plant due to failure of company to
consider conservation); Armond Cohen & Michael W. Townsley, Perspectives on Collaboration As
Replacement for Confrontation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1, 1990, at 10 ("[Imn mid-1987... the traditional
environmental and consumer advocates contended that a massive building program wasn't justified until
the conservation resource had been more fully developed. This battle was joined in nearly every rate case
and power plant siting decision in New England, as it had been for several years.").
26. Gonzalez Interview, supra note 24. For a discussion of the benefits of the CPP over litigation in
rate cases, see itfra text accompanying notes 58-67.
27. DAVID ROE, DYNAMOS AND VIROINS (1984).
28. Id. at 200.
29. Re Conn. Light and Power Co., No. 87-07-01, 90 P.U.R.4th 148 (Conn. D.P.U.C. 1988). This case
began with the typical rate case intervention scenario. CL&P asked CDPUC to reduce the amount it was
required to spend on conservation investment. The Conservation Law Foundation intervened, and introduced
evidence that "Itihe cost per kilowatt of a massive conservation project was estimated at or less than six
cents per kilowatt-hour, compared with eight to 9.5 cents for new plants." William B. Ellis, The
Collaborative Process in Utility Resource Planning, PUB. UrIL. FORT., June 22, 1989, at 9-10. In response,
the Commission increased the CL&P conservation budget by $7.9 million, and requested the parties to work
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representatives from a major environmental group created the CPP, in which
the contentious C&LM issues that had been raised in the rate case were
resolved through consensus-based negotiation. The group's agreements were
then transmitted to CDPUC for approval. 30 The feelings of the parties about
this first use of the CPP are a sharp contrast to Roe's assessment of the PG&E
rate case.3  The negotiating parties quickly resolved approximately 80% of
the issues that had seemed unresolvable in the adversarial setting.32 By May
1990, all proposed utility conservation programs were in operation, and the
utility estimated that approximately $50 million in capacity expenses had been
avoided.33
II. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE CPP
The purpose of the CPP is to provide a consensual alternative to rate case
litigation for the development of C&LM proposals. 34 It is conducted in
specially formed negotiation groups, or "collaboratives." There are three
general types of CPP participants: utilities, nonutility parties (NUP's), and
representatives of the regulatory commission staff.35 NUP's are parties that
have an acknowledged interest in the matter, and they are often drawn from
the intervenors in an ongoing rate case.36 In their study of collaboratives
nationwide, undertaken for the United States Department of Energy, Raab and
together to determine how the money should be spent. See 90 P.U.R.4th at 217 ("The Company shall
develop an electric conservation work plan ... in consultation with Department staff and interested parties
and intervenors to this proceeding.").
30. See Letter from members of CL&P collaborative to Robert J. Murphy, Executive Secretary,
Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control (May 25, 1988), in Northeast Utilities Collaborative
Notebook, on file at the Connecticut Office of Policy Management, Hartford, Conn. [hereinafter N.U. Note-
book].
31. See, e.g., id. ("Consensus has been reached on a major portion of the programs that have been
discussed.... [W]e hope to continue this cooperative approach to address difficult and complex C&LM
issues .... "). CDPUC was similarly pleased with the experiment. See, e.g., Letter from Robert J. Murphy,
Executive Secretary, Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control, to Walter F. Torrance, Jr., Senior
Vice President and General Counsel, Northeast Utilities (June 22, 1988), in N.U. Notebook, supra note 30
("The Authority indicated its pleasure with the cooperation and dedication of all the participants .... The
planning process has brought together a group with diverse interests to produce programs .... The
Authority encourages the committee to continue its work to resolve the outstanding issues").
32. NANCY HIRSH, BUILDING A BRIGHTER FUTURE: STATE EXPERIENCES IN LEAST-COST ELECTRICAL
PLANNING 22-23 (1990).
33. Id. at 23.
34. See Comments on the Collaborative Procedures by the Nonutility Parties Participating in the UI
and CL&P Collaboratives and by the United Illuminating Company I (Oct. 9, 1992), [hereinafter NUP
Comments], in Notice of Written Comments, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Utility Control
(Oct. 9, 1992), and Responsive Comments [hereinafter Notice of Comments & Comments] (on file with
author).
35. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding for Connecticut Light & Power Co. Collaborative at I
(August 15, 1990) [hereinafter CL&P Memorandum] (on file with author); Southern Connecticut Gas
Company Conservation Collaborative Procedural Guidelines at I [hereinafter SCGC Guidelines] (on file
with author).
36. JONATHAN RAAB & MARTIN SCI-WETZER, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN INTEGRATED RESOURCE
PLANNING: A STUDY OF DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT COLLABORATIVES 9 (1992).
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Schweitzer found five different types of NUP's represented: "consumer/public
advocates . . . ; environmental/conservation advocates; large industrial
electricity users; state regulatory advocacy staff; and state energy offices., 37
Commission representatives can give guidance on policy, but nothing that they
say is binding on later commission actions regarding CPP results.38
The CPP operates with three tiers of authority. The regulatory commission
has the final authority to approve or reject the collaborative results. Within the
collaborative itself, there is an executive committee composed of persons of
authority from each of the participating groups. 39 Beneath this a working
group, composed of mid-level managers and technical staff, works on the
mechanics of the programs, and blends the suggestions and technical
information from the different parties.4°
A unique feature of the CPP is that the utilities fund technical supervisors
for the NUP's.4 ' Most NUP's would find it impossible to obtain necessary
research in any other way, and would thus be forced either to accept the
technical data provided by the utility or to return to litigation.42 In addition,
utilities often supply the NUP's with proprietary information, which the NUP's
agree not to disclose or use in a later adversarial proceeding if the
collaborative fails.43
The CPP allows parties to plan and develop conservation programs in a
comprehensive and integrated manner, rather than simply resolving problems
37. Id. at 13. The most frequently represented NUP's were those representing environmental concerns,
followed by those representing consumer concerns. Id. at 14.
38. See, e.g., RobertJ. Murphy, Executive Secretary, Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control,
Letter appointing Mark Quinlan, Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control Assistant Rate Specialist,
to represent CDPUC in the first collaborative, April 11, 1988 in N.U. Notebook, supra note 30. Regarding
Mr. Quinlan's role, the letter states:
Although Mr. Quinlan may occasionally make program suggestions, his primary purpose will
be to observe the process and facilitate consensus development. D.P.U.C. staff involvement does
not imply that actions taken at the meetings, statements in the minutes of the meetings or
programs recommended by the group are approved by the D.P.U.C.
39. See Agreement for the Collaborative Development of Demand-Side Management Programs for
United Illuminating Co. [hereinafter U.I. Agreement] (on file with author); CL&P Memorandum, supra note
35, at 1; see also HIRSH, supra note 32, at 23.
40. HIRSH, supra note 32, at 23; U.I. Agreement, supra note 39, at 1. CL&P includes additional
subgroups as needed. CL&P Memorandum, supra note 35, at 1-2. As a backdrop to the structure of
authority it was established in the initial collaborative that "[allthough the purpose of this cooperative effort
is to reach consensus ... [the utility] retains full control and final authority over all decisions." C&LM
Working Group Meeting Minutes I (March 11, 1988) [hereinafter March Il Minutes], in N.U. Notebook,
supra note 30.
41. March II Minutes, supra note 40, at 1; see also CL&P Memorandum, supra note 35, at 3; U.I.
Agreement, supra note 39, at 2.
42. See Cohen & Townsley, supra note 25, at 11; Ellis, supra note 29, at 10-11. The utilities, of
course, also derive a benefit from the provision of funding: if they do not provide it, the other parties will
not participate. Interview with Allan Johanson, Assistant Director of Energy Unit, State of Connecticut
Office of Policy and Management, in Hartford, Conn. (March 17, 1992).
43. See, e.g., CL&P Memorandum, supra note 35, at 3 ("[l1n order to promote the spirit of cooperation
and compromise intended by this agreement, it is understood and agreed that the collaborative effort...
is in the nature of settlement discussions and that any internal communication ... [or] documents, reports
or other materials prepared by the parties or their experts... shall be neither admissible nor discoverable
.. . )
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related to an isolated rate case." Meetings of either executive group or
working group participants are scheduled as necessary.4 At these meetings,
C&LM proposals are suggested or modified, data from the technical experts
is introduced and discussed, and policy issues are raised.
All decisions within the collaboratives are made by consensus.46 Different
methods are used to accomplish this result, including referring unresolved
issues to a smaller subgroup 47 or hiring specially trained consensus
facilitators. 4" The ultimate purpose of the CPP is to create a stipulated
agreement on C&LM proposals. CPP agreements provide a mechanism for
creating this stipulation and describe the extent to which it will be considered
binding on CPP parties.49 This stipulation then forms the basis for the C&LM
proposals that the utility submits to the regulatory commission. ° Once a
consensus is reached on outstanding issues, rather than disbanding, the
collaborative participants turn their attention to new matters.
The basic design of the CPP has been adopted to resolve conflicts between
utilities and intervenors around the country.5 ' The CPP often seems
responsible for substantial increases in utility conservation budgets and in
consumer participation in conservation programs.5 2 Nationwide, annual
44. See, e.g., March I 1 Minutes, supra note 40, at I ("The outside interested parties see an ongoing
process where they are not only part of the planning but also monitor implementation as well as evaluate
and make suggestions for modifications when necessary."); see also C&LM Working Group Meeting
Minutes 3 (March 25, 1988), in N.U. Notebook, supra note 30 (outlining list of long-term issues which
would have to be addressed by the Oversight Committee after the collaborative filing).
45. There is a wide variety in the frequency of CPP group meetings. The Connecticut Office of Policy
and Management recommends tentatively scheduling meetings twice a month, see Letter from Susan
Shimelman, Under Secretary, Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, to Robert J. Murphy,
Executive Secretary, Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control app. 3 (Oct. 9, 1992) [hereinafter
Shimelman Letter], in Notice of Comments & Comments, supra note 34, while Yankeegas believes that
meetings once a month might be too frequent, see Consolidated Gas Utility Comments on Collaborative
Process Guidelines [hereinafter Consolidated Gas Utility Comments], in Notice of Comments & Comments,
supra note 34, at 3.
46. See March II Minutes, supra note 40, at 1; U.I. Agreement, supra note 39, at 1; SCGC
Guidelines, supra note 35, at 4. The SCGC Guidelines note that programs may be filed without unanimous
agreement as long as opposing viewpoints are represented. Id.
47. See March 11 Minutes, supra note 40, at 2.
48. See, e.g., Letter from E.F. Taylor, Jr., Director, Conservation and Load Management Department,
Northeast Utilities, to members of CL&P collaborative (February 17, 1988), in N.U. Notebook, supra note
30 (announcing hiring of Terry Barnett of Conflict Management, Inc.).
49. See, e.g., SCGC Guidelines, supra note 35, at 3-4.
50. See, e.g., Shimelman Letter, supra note 45, at app. 3-4.
5 1. The process has been used in California, Ohio, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New
York, Maryland, Wisconsin, and elsewhere. RAAB & SCHWErrZER, supra note 36, at 4 (1992). But see Re
Benefits to Ratepayers and Utilities from Implementation of Conservation Programs that Will Reduce
Electric Use, No. 89-15, 103 P.U.R.4th 97 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1989) (declining to require utility to enter into
collaborative process).
52. Since it began using the collaborative process, for example, Boston Edison (BE) experienced the
following: in 1987, 18,484 BE customers participated in C&LM, compared to 108,691 in 1990. In 1987,
BE spent $5.2 million on conservation, and produced 10.4 GWH in energy savings. In 1990, it spent $29.5
million and produced 127.6 GWH in energy savings, plus 97.87 MWH in capacity savings. Bernice K.
McIntyre & Bernard W. Reznicek, Collaborative Approaches to Conservation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., March
1, 1992, at 16, 19.
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C&LM investment by utilities using some version of the CPP rose from $247
million to $648 million during the time that the CPP was used.53
III. AN EVALUATION OF THE CPP
A. The Benefits of the CPP Over Rate Case Litigation
From the perspective of the participants, the CPP is a success.54 The
satisfaction of the participants may be due to the fact that C&LM disputes are
particularly suited to resolution through ADR. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act
of 1991, provides a list of the characteristics that make disputes appropriate
for resolution through negotiation. Among these characteristics are a limited
number of significantly affected interests, adequate representatives for these
interests, and parties that are willing to negotiate in good faith.56 C&LM
disputes almost always possess all three of these characteristics. The parties to
C&LM disputes tend to be utilities and large, well-organized public interest
groups. These parties are limited in number and easily identified, and their own
institutional structures produce adequate representatives. The dissatisfaction
that these parties have experienced with rate case litigation makes them willing
to negotiate in good faith.57
A comparison of rate case litigation with the CPP points out several
reasons why the CPP might be preferable for resolving C&LM-related
disputes. In rate cases, parties take extreme positions, withhold from opponents
information that might be fruitfully shared, and present the impression that
their opponents' views are without merit, thereby foreclosing any chance to
learn from them. The need to present a fissureless adversarial facade causes
parties to place equal weight on all of their arguments, giving neither the other
side nor the commission an indication of what is centrally important to them,
or on what issues they would be willing to compromise.5 1
In rate cases, the parties are kept away from each other, in part from the
fear that they will disclose forensically significant information. Contact is made
through lawyers, who do not have the authority or knowledge to adjust
53. RAAB & SCHWEITZER, supra note 36, at 46. It is impossible to say what increases would have
occurred had utilities and NUP's pursued litigation instead. Also, whether these numbers represent a success
depends on whether the money was well spent.
54. On April 7, 1992, CDPUC held a "Technical Meeting" with several of the Connecticut CPP
participants to discuss the advantages, disadvantages, and future scope of the collaboratives. See Agenda
of Technical Meeting (on file with author). At this meeting, it was unanimously agreed that the
collaboratives were a vast improvement over intervention in rate cases. Raab and Schweitzer found similar
enthusiasm in their study of CPP participants. RAAB & SCHwErrZER, supra note 36, at 38.
55. Pub. L. No. 101-648, § 3(a), 104 Stat. 4969, 4970-77 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 581-90 (vest
Supp. 1992)).
56. 5 U.S.C.A. § 583 (Vest Supp. 1992).
57. See generally, Cohen & Townsley, supra note 25; Ellis, supra note 29.
58. Cf. ADNIINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
SOURCEBOOK 2 (David M. Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 1990) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
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proposals flexibly. In the CPP, it is the technical staff and principals of the
parties themselves who meet face-to-face, and these individuals have the
resources to create optimal solutions."
Because of the confidentiality that CPP agreements provide, problem
solving is enhanced through access to all relevant information. This creates
opportunities to achieve "win-win" results, where parties reach previously
unconsidered outcomes which will make them all better off.
60
In rate cases, each issue is aired before the commission and is potentially
the subject of a binding determination applicable in other situations. This
forces parties to attend to principles out of concern for precedent rather than
to solve practical problems.6 In the CPP, parties are able to exchange ideas
out of the view of the commission, giving them the chance to introduce subtle
improvements and persuade other parties of the soundness of their point of
view.62
Since C&LM programs tend to be prototypical or experimental, they may
be inherently unsuited to adversarial factfinding procedures.63 Experimental
programs benefit from early participation from all parties concerned. In the
litigation context, the only way for NUP's to have input into these programs
was to challenge utility proposals once they were fully formed and before the
regulatory commission. By contrast, the CPP gives NUP's a chance to
participate in designing conservation programs from their inception, and to
influence policy before planners become intellectually or emotionally wedded
to an idea.64
The CPP is also particularly suited to C&LM problems because it
enlightens the utilities and the NUP's about the objectives and constraints of
their opposition. In the collaboratives, NUP's learn the realities of
implementing programs in the context of a large company,65 and utility
59. HIRSH, supra note 32, at 30. Cf. 5 U.S.C.A. § 581 (note on Congressional findings) (West Supp.
1992); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 28 (1982).
60. Cf. Mary-Lynne Fisher & Arnold 1. Siegel, Evaluating Negotiation Behavior and Results: Can We
Identify What We Say We Know?, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 395, 423 (1987).
61. Cf. HENRY H. PERR1T, JR., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, USE OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING TO
DEVELOP A PROPOSED OSHA HEALTH STANDARD FOR MDA 33 (1988) reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 58, at 661.
62. While nothing prevented the parties in ratemaking cases from meeting to discuss issues before,
the fact that they were in opposing "armed camps" made this highly unlikely. Comments at Technical
Meeting, see Agenda of Technical Meeting, supra note 54.
63. Telephone Interview with Peter Boucher, former Commissioner, Connecticut Department of Public
Utility Control (Mar. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Boucher Interview]; see also The Forum: Question 2: Dispute
Resolution, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 8, 1990, at 28, 30-31 [hereinafter Forum] (Kenneth Gordon of the
Maine Public Utilities Commission also believes that an adversarial approach is not suited to resolving
disputes over appropriate conservation measures since these disputes are about policy rather than facts).
64. Telephone Interview with Joel Gordes, Technical Coordinator, United Illuminating Collaborative
(Mar. 18, 1992).
65. Cohen & Townsley, supra note 25, at 10-I1.
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product planners learn from the creativity and experience of the NUP's and
their consultants. 6
Finally, in most collaboratives there are utility parties that seek to
maximize profits and well-organized environmental groups that seek to
maximize conservation. Contract theory would indicate that any settlement
dictated by a third party would be less likely to satisfy the objectives of these
parties than one that they arrived at themselves.67
B. Criticism of the CPP: Illegitimacy, Expense, and the Need for an
Organizing Statute
Many collaboratives have resulted in a high level of participant
satisfaction. Participant satisfaction, however, is not the sole criterion of the
CPP's legitimacy or effectiveness. Some critics claim that, regardless of the
impressive results of the CPP in individual cases, it is not legitimate for private
parties to negotiate public policy.65 The CPP is also criticized for its expense
and its awkward relation to the traditional regulatory apparatus. These
problems have resulted in the failure of a number of collaboratives,69 and in
complaints that the CPP subverts utility regulation to serve the ends of the
CPP participants.70
At this time there are no official procedural guidelines informing the
development of the CPP. States have remained passive as collaboratives have
evolved, allowing each to emerge7' and develop in its own way according to
the contractual arrangements of the parties.72 Some regulatory agencies are
now questioning whether the CPP really improves on traditional procedures
and, if so, whether regulatory agencies or legislatures should act to correct
some of its flaws and ensure its procedural integrity.73
66. Ellis, supra note 29, at 11-12. Telephone Interview with Philip Turner, Director of Market and
Research Development, United Illuminating (Mar. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Turner Interview].
67. Interview with Wayne V. Estey, Senior Economist, Connecticut Department of Public Utility
Control, in New Britain, Conn. (Apr. 7, 1992) [hereinafter Estey Interview].
68. See infra text accompanying notes 88-107.
69. See, e.g., it re Potomac Elec. Power Co., No. 834, 123 P.U.R.4th 313, 358 (WUTC 1991)
(collaborative disbanded after participants "failed to demonstrate the ability to work together effectively,");
Washington Commission "Discourages" Collaboration With Customer Groups, INDUS. ENERGY BULL., Feb.
14, 1992, at I [hereinafter Washington Commission] (continuation of CPP discouraged since a litigation
format would better serve the Commission in pursuing its objectives); Central Vermont PS is Fighting Plan
Forcing Home Switch to Oil, Propane, ELEc. UTIL. WK, Jan. 28, 1991, at 4 (collaborative parties reverted
to litigation because utility believed collaborative was extending beyond the scope of its authority).
70. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
71. The second collaborative, for example, was begun voluntarily when United Illuminating
approached CDPUC for help in C&LM planning. They were fortuitously able to use the same nonutility
parties that were involved in the CL&P collaborative. Turner Interview, supra note 66. For a discussion
of the various ways that collaboratives have been initiated, see RAAB & SCHWEIrZER, supra note 36, at 9.
72. See, e.g., U.I. Agreement, supra note 39; CL&P Memorandum, supra note 35; SCGC Guidelines,
supra note 35.
73. The April 7, 1992 Technical Meeting, for example, was convened to discuss, among other things,
"[Hlow could the [collaborative] process be improved to make it more effective and increase the level of
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The problems of the CPP could best be addressed through the passage of
an organizing statute that prescribed a format and increased its efficiency. This
process has proven to be an effective solution to the problems of other
experimental, ADR-based administrative procedures, particularly the Negotiated
Rulemaking Process (Reg-Neg). In many ways, the CPP is reminiscent of Reg-
Neg, which was developed in federal administrative agencies in the 1970's and
1980's. At that time, selected agencies began to bring together representatives
of the agency and of various interest groups to attempt to reach a consensus
on a proposed rule before it was promulgated.74 By 1990, Reg-Neg was in the
same state that the CPP is in now: several rules had been successfully drafted
using the process, 75 but Reg-Neg had procedural and substantive imperfec-
tions.76  The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
attempted to provide guidance at the administrative level for conducting Reg-
Negs, 77 and individual agencies attempted in an ad hoc manner to develop
regulatory negotiation procedures.78 Despite the availability of these adminis-
trative-level procedures, the use of Reg-Neg was uneven and unsatisfactory,
largely because there was no unified body of procedural guidelines, and
because agencies questioned the process's legitimacy.79 The Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 199080 (NRA) creates a unitary response to Reg-Neg's
perceived problems while allowing for flexibility.
satisfaction of those participating? ... Are procedures and/or other formal guidelines needed to improve
the process?" Agenda of Technical Meeting, supra note 54. On October 9, 1992, CDPUC published a
Notice of Written Comments, indicating that CDPUC intended, to the extent possible, to establish
uniformity in the administration of the collaboratives by adopting procedural and program guidelines. The
notice asked CPP participants to submit written comments and recommendations on procedural guidelines,
program guidelines, policy guidelines, policy issues appropriate for consideration by the collaboratives, and
the future role of the collaboratives in relation to the department. Notice of Comments & Comments, supra
note 34.
74. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at 1.
75. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 14,925 (1989) (NRC); 50 Fed. Reg. 35,374 (1985) (EPA); 50 Fed. Reg.
29,306 (1985) (FAA).
76. See generally SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58.
77. See, e.g., Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation No. 85-5), 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.85-5 (1992); Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation No. 82-4), 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.82-4 (1992).
78. See, e.g., EPA Regulatory Negotiation Project, 48 Fed. Reg. 7,494 (1983) (announcing creation
of Regulatory Negotiation Project to test utility and value of Reg-Neg and suggest guidelines for utilizing
the procedure).
79. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 581 (West Supp. 1992) (note on Congressional findings) (federal agencies
did not use Reg-Neg widely prior to passage of the NRA, in part because they were uncertain as to their
authority to use the procedure); Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 1st Cong., 1st
Sess. 22, 24 (1989) (statement of Marshall J. Breger, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United
States) [hereinafter Breger Statement] (claiming agencies were hesitant to use Reg-Neg without authorizing
statute "because they question whether they have the statutory authority to delegate the process of drafting
a proposed rule to a committee. Or, they may question the implication of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act for negotiated rulemaking.... [A] statute would remove any doubt about agency authority.").




Although it is too early to fully evaluate the success of the NRA, the
preliminary data appears promising. The NRA provides a formalized method
for participants to gain access to the procedure, thereby alleviating many due
process concerns about the informal use of Reg-Neg.8' Relying on the statute,
a variety of federal agencies are now using Reg-Neg, 2 and some agencies
have successfully used the process to develop proposed rules.83 Other
agencies have used the procedures established in the NRA to determine that
rules under consideration were not appropriate for Reg-Neg, and would be
better developed through traditional administrative processes.'
The NRA, and the experience of federal agencies in developing it, can be
instructive in designing an organizing statute for the CPP. There are significant
differences between Reg-Neg and the CPP, however, which indicate that an
organizing statute for the CPP should be different in many respects from the
NRA. Reg-Neg negotiation groups are assembled to produce one rule, while
CPP groups are long-term planning units with life spans of several years."
Because of the diversity of factual situations and parties that the NRA must
accommodate, no substantive public policy preferences are established in that
statute: it is procedural only. The CPP is exclusively for the utility industry,
and was developed to address disputes over utility conservation, so the
organizing statute should contain a statement of the societal preference for
conservation over expansion of energy production capacity. Finally, there is no
analogue to the relationship between utilities and regulatory commissions in
most situations in which Reg-Neg is used. These differences should be
reflected in differences between the NRA and the organizing statute for the
CPP.
When faced with the prospect of codifying the CPP, many CPP
participants expressed fear that this would stifle the creativity and flexibility
that has been responsible for the process's success. 6 It is true that, in its
81. See infra text accompanying notes 116-118.
82. See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 42,533 (1992) (EPA); 57 Fed. Reg. 39,661 (1992) (FCC); 57 Fed. Reg.
1,139 (1992) (Coast Guard, DOT).
83. The proposed FCA regulations for apportioning administrative expense assessments were based
in large part on a Reg-Neg Committee formed pursuant to the NRA. See 57 Fed. Reg. 47,288 (1992). In
addition, EPA has developed its proposed rule on the regulation of fuels and fuel additives and standards
for reformulated and conventional gasoline through the NRA. See 57 Fed. Reg. 13,416 (1992).
84. See, e.g., Determination Not To Establish a Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, 57 Fed. Reg.
10,621 (1992) (FERC). In this instance, FERC considered using the NRA to develop a uniform and
comprehensive proposed regulation govening ex-parte communications between persons outside the
Commission and Commission officials and employees. Relying on the criteria for appropriateness for the
procedure established in the NRA, FERC determined that the number of significant identifiable interests
would be too large to permit them to be represented by a balanced committee of workable size.
85. The shortest collaborative studied by Raab and Schweitzer had been ongoing for six months.
Others had been ongoing for over three years. RAAB & SCHWEITZER, supra note 36, at 43.
86. This fear was voiced by many of the CPP participants with whom I spoke in the course of
preparing this Note. See also Letter from Terry C. Ranger, Director, Conservation and Load Management,
Northeast Utilities, to Robert J. Murphy, Executive Secretary, Connecticut Department of Public Utility
Control 2 (Oct. 9, 1992) [hereinafter Ranger Letter], in Notice of Comments & Comments, supra note 34
("[A]n important aspect of the collaborative process ... is its informal format. ... CL&P would be
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initial stages, the CPP may have benefited from a lack of regulation, since
traditionally hostile parties might have been unwilling to cooperate within a
statutory framework that limited their routes of escape if the experiment failed.
The time for unstructured experimentation, however, has passed. Due process
requires that affected interests have equal access to the CPP proceedings, and
efficiency concerns require guidelines to increase the CPP's transferability to
new utilities and new problems. In addition, portions of the organizing statute
for the CPP could be permissive, allowing CPP participants to opt out of
specific provisions.
If the statute makes these allowances for flexibility,87  continued
opposition to statutory guidelines from present CPP participants deserves less
consideration. Regardless of the effort that these parties expended to develop
the CPP, they have no "squatter's right" in maintaining it as a private preserve
of political power. An organizing statute could maintain a large part of the
flexibility that CPP participants legitimately prize, while eliminating the
insularity that the CPP's critics legitimately fear.
1. Specific Criticisms of the CPP and Appropriate Legislative Responses
a. Political Legitimacy of the CPP
Some critics claim that negotiation-based administrative procedures are per
se illegitimate. 88 In order to participate in a CPP, a party must be large,
powerful, and well-organized. While such parties can be counted on to
represent their own interests, critics have pointed out that the CPP participants
do not necessarily represent the public interest.89
Utility regulatory agencies were created to actively promote the public
interest, not just the interests of the regulated community and their most well-
concerned if the Department, in an attempt to achieve some uniformity ... diminished the usefulness of
the CL&P collaborative process."); NUP Comments, supra note 34, at 2 ("[Gluidelines [for the CPP]
should ... not bring a degree of rigidity which may make the process less effective.").
87. The NRA addresses the fear of loss of flexibility directly: "Nothing in this subchapter should be
construed as an attempt to limit innovation and experimentation with the negotiated rulemaking process or
with other innovative rulemaking procedures otherwise authorized by law." 5 U.S.C.A. § 581 (Vest Supp.
1992).
88. See, e.g., William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public
Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 89 (1987).
89. See, e.g., Bruce W. Radford, The Hijackers Meet the Sharp Pencil, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 1, 1991,
at 4 ("It's been suggested lately that environmentalists [in the CPP] have hijacked the state public service
commissions, pushing utility regulators toward resource management, and away from their traditional role,
which was to oversee a regulated monopoly, keep rates down, and service up."); see also Forum, supra
note 63, at 31 (Dean J. Miller of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, discussing the use of ADR to settle
utility-regulatory disputes, warns that "[clare must be taken... to avoid transferring the decision-making
responsibility away from public officials and into the hands of private negotiators."); Alfred E. Kahn,
Environmentalists Hijack the Utility Regulators, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 7, 1991, at A- 10 (suggesting that public
interest intervenors may have "captured" public utility commissions).
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organized adversaries."' Traditionally they have done this through an
analytically-based approach which considers policy objectives, and chooses
alternatives for meeting those objectives based on a rational decision about
what will most effectively advance the public good.9' The CPP substitutes for
this public law solution a private law solution whose goal is arriving at a
consensus among the negotiating parties.92 This means that CPP results can
satisfy the participants and at the same time fail to satisfy objective deter-
minations of the public good.93 In their study of collaboratives nationwide,
in fact, Raab and Schweitzer found that the process consistently enabled some
groups to satisfy their interests more than others. 94
Troubling conflicts arise between the requirements of due process and the
needs of the CPP as currently organized. Successful collaboratives can endure
for years95 without a change in personnel, which can allow the participants
to lose sight of concerns other than those of their CPP colleagues. In
addition, the confidentiality of the CPP proceedings, and the fact that utilities
fund the research efforts of the NUP's, create the risk that utilities will co-opt
NUP's, or will be perceived to have done so.
Finally, both co-option and confidentiality problems aggravate-and are
aggravated by-the risk of subsequent litigation. Proprietary information is
shared within the collaborative to facilitate planning and negotiation. Because
this information must be kept confidential, the CPP does not create a formal
evidentiary record to support its results if a nonparticipant challenges them or
if the commission does not approve the collaborative stipulation.97 Parties
90. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-2(g) (1991) ("No member of the [CDPUC] shall ... have any
interest.., which is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his duties or employment in the
public interest .... "); id. § 16-19(a) (1991) (CDPUC to investigate proposed rate amendments when
necessary for public interest).
91. Cf. Funk, supra note 88, at 90-91.
92. Cf. id. at 92.
93. Cf. Wald, supra note 4, at 22 ("The parties could have good reason to want a particular result even
if it made little or no sense .... ). This is an often-expressed fear in administrative law cases. See, e.g.,
Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9,53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) (concerning
rules for pay television: "[Wle are particularly concerned that the final shaping of the rules we are
reviewing here may have been by compromise among the contending industry forces, rather than by
exercise of the independent discretion in the public interest the Communications Act vests in individual
commissioners."); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (administrative agency's role as representative of the public interest "does not
permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right
of the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the Commission.").
94. RAAB & Sc-vEnrTR, supra note 36, at 40.
95. See id. at 43.
96. Some CPP participants may be recognizing this fact. In response to a request from CDPUC for
suggestions on procedural guidelines for the CPP, Susan Shimelman of the Connecticut Office of Policy
and Management responded that she welcomed the "Department's intention to establish uniformity in
procedural and program guidelines" because the CPP "needs to be institutionalized in a manner which
permits more public participation at critical points." Shimelman Letter, supra note 45.
97. In Re Connecticut Light and Power Co., No. 90-12-03, 124 P.U.R.4th 532 (Conn. D.P.U.C. 1991),
for example, the parties to a CPP presented a consensus-based conservation budget to CDPUC. Although
the Commission "appreciate[d] the work the collaborative group ha[d] done," it decided that "in light of
the present capacity situation and pressures to hold down rates," id. at 569, it would reduce the conservation
19931 1249
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 102: 1235
who feel that their interests were not represented in the CPP are more likely
to engage in post-collaborative litigation to challenge the results.98 If the
commission is biased in favor of the results of the CPP, nonparticipants, who
have already been excluded from the planning process, will also have a more
difficult time influencing the agency by traditional means.99 On the other
hand, if the commission grants no presumption in favor of the CPP results,
participation in the CPP may be stifled. Most parties do not have the personnel
to develop records for rate cases concurrently with participation in
collaboratives, and since orders are formulated in rate cases, parties fearing
litigation may consider forsaking the CPP. Similarly, collaborative
participants-who regularly concede less important points on the promise that
their most important concerns will be addressed 1° -° will not be willing to
compromise if they fear that the points that they have won may be rejected
later by the commission.'0 '
There is a significant danger, therefore, that the utilities and the
participating NUP's will be able to achieve mutually acceptable results which,
if adopted by the commission, could unfairly affect the rights of
nonparticipants. This can happen in a number of ways. The conservation
measures adopted by the CPP usually must be justified as cost-effective.' 2
Cost-effectiveness, however, can be measured by the effect on the program
participants' energy bills, on all utility customers' energy bills, or on total
budget for the 1991-1992 year from $63 million to $55 million. CDPUC REPORT, supra note 22, at 19.
Because no record had been developed in the rate hearing to support the proposed level of conservation,
there was very little that the CPP participants could do in response. Gonzalez interview, supra note 24. The
WUTC in Washington, D.C. recently discouraged the use of the CPP, in part because it felt that the process
presented it with conclusions without sufficiently showing how those conclusions were reached. The WUTC
"expressed the need to better document the collaborative process-and its results-to ensure a public
record." Washington Commission, supra note 69. Grant Tanner, a lawyer for the Washington Industrial
Committee For Fair Utility Rates, which had participated in this CPP, also felt that the lack of a record was
a weakness in the process, stating that "[tihe litigation format does allow you to build a record so you can
go to court if you are dissatisfied with the result." Id; see also RAAB & SCHWEITZER, supra note 36, at 32-
33 (discussing CPP filings to which regulatory commissions have ordered changes).
98. Raab and Schweitzer noted that nearly all of the approvals of CPP results thus far have come only
after contested hearings in which parties who were not part of the CPP, or who were part of the CPP but
did not accept its results, litigated their concerns before the regulatory commission. RAAB & SCHWErrzER,
supra note 36, at 31-32.
99. Cf. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1511, 1558 n.235 (1992) (noting similar problems with Reg-Neg). Prior to the passage of the NRA,
Judge Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit was wary of granting a presumption in favor of negotiated
rules, pointing out that there were no mechanisms in place to ensure sufficient interest representation to
warrant such a presumption. Wald, supra note 4, at 20-22.
100. Boucher Interview, supra note 63; see also SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at 6.
101. Boucher Interview, supra note 63; cf. Hater, supra note 59, at 112 (listing among the fears about
participating in Reg-Neg that the agency might reject proposed agreement and make fundamental changes).
102. See, e.g., Re Connecticut Light and Power Co., No. 90-12-03, 124 P.U.R.4th 532, 568-71 (Conn.
D.P.U.C. 1991); CDPUC REPORT, supra note 22, at iii.
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societal resources. 0 3 A measure can be "cost effective," therefore, while
increasing the utility bills of particular segments of the population.10
4
The choice of conservation program designs can also have disparate impact
on different groups. Utility investment programs for the residential sector that
are limited to loans or partial grants, for example, may exclude participation
by indigent, senior, or rental households.0 5 As a result of such investments,
however, these households may still pay higher utility bills.10 6 Building
design professionals, energy service companies, and others may also be
particularly affected by the specific conservation measures chosen.'07
The CPP should not be considered illegitimate per se simply because it
uses negotiation between interested private parties to arrive at solutions to
public problems. The traditional model of objective and analytical policy
formation by administrative agencies has no preeminent claim to
legitimacy. 0 8 We allow private parties in civil suits with broad social
ramifications to negotiate settlements, which are then judicially approved.'0 9
In addition, we require utilities to carry out public policies not integrally
related to their central mandate of providing utility services."0 Surely these
same utilities, who best know their own capabilities, should also participate in
shaping these policies."'
103. Shimelman Letter, supra note 45, at 2.
104. See Kahn, supra note 89. ("[Wlhen commissions begin to impose on [utilities] responsibilities
and large costs at the expense of nonparticipants in the conservation programs, it is time to ask whether
that is compatible with their historic mandate.... I suggest we add to the conventional wisdom about the
,capture' of regulatory agencies by the companies they are supposed to regulate, a recognition of the
possibility of capture by public interest intervenors ... .
105. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at n.124.
106. See, e.g., Re Connecticut Light and Power Co., No. 90-12-03, 124 P.U.R.4th 532, 570 (Conn.
D.P.U.C. 1991) ("The cost of C&LM programs must be paid by all customers, which results in higher
rates.").
107. RAAB & SCHWErIZER, supra note 36, at 16.
108. The constitutionality of American administrative agencies, both federal and state, has been, and
continues to be, questioned on a number of grounds. See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 33-139 (3rd ed. 1992).
109. Harter, supra note 59, at 36-38; see, e.g., Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984) (approving consent agreement reached by African-American parents, city, and
state).
110. Estey Interview, supra note 67. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-262c (1992) (no electric or gas
company may terminate or refuse to reinstate residential electric or gas service in hardship cases between
November and April); id. § 16-19dd (1990) (moratorium on changing rates of agricultural customer from
residential to commercial rates).
11. This is particularly true because many of these policy measures are undertaken for reasons other
than efficiency. See, e.g., Re Connecticut Light and Power Co., No. 88-05-25, 100 P.U.R.4th 452, 472
(Conn. D.P.U.C. 1988) ("A program targeted to a particularly needy group may argue for its adoption over
another which has greater conservation or load management impact."). Legislators that make these kinds
of choices are immune from their impacts. A utility, however, faces the risk that the expenditure will be
disallowed as imprudent. See, e.g., Application of CL&P to Increase its Rates and Revenues, No. 85-10-22,
1986 Conn PUC LEXIS 116, * 192 (Conn. D.P.U.C. 1986) (while the CDPUC told the company to "initiate
economic conservation and load management measures and not rely on pre-approval," it warned also that
"[TIhe Authority is specifically concerned about conservation programs which cannot assure that
conservation will actually occur."). Utilities interested in protecting their shareholders, therefore, will be
more risk-averse in carrying out state policies than legislators might prefer. Estey Interview, supra note 67.
The CPP addresses this problem by providing a limited preapproval of conservation expenditures. See
The Yale Law Journal
As currently implemented, however, the CPP does not have safeguards
adequate for protecting the public good. The organizing statute which I suggest
in this Note addresses this concern in several ways. First, it creates a formal
method for parties to gain access to CPP negotiations. Second, it clarifies the
procedural rights and obligations of the participants within a collaborative.
Finally, the statute contains an expression of legislative preference for utility
conservation over expanded production capacity. This would ensure that,
although the CPP results were achieved by interested private parties, they took
objectively-determined public policy goals into account.
The lack of a formal method of gaining access to a collaborative is
currently one of the CPP's most troubling shortcomings.1 2 There are two
types of parties to a collaborative: parties mandatory to all collaboratives,"1
3
and parties who must be included because the particular proceeding affects
their interests. 4 The statute could provide a list of mandatory parties and
define the roles they should play.
The current practice of determining nonmandatory CPP participants by
choosing the intervenors in an ongoing rate case" 5 is not appropriate,
because interests may be affected that do not have the resources to intervene.
In rate cases, the commission could be expected to represent these interests.
The more passive role of the commission in the CPP requires that greater care
be taken to include disenfranchised parties.
The NRA provides a two-step process for party selection. First, the agency
formally identifies the parties that will be affected by the matter." 6 Second,
the intent to conduct a negotiated rulemaking is published in the Federal
Register and appropriate trade papers." 7 Additional parties can join the
negotiations after showing that they are significantly affected by the action and
that their interests will not be adequately represented unless they join."
8
A similar procedure should be prescribed for the CPP. The regulatory
commission could be charged with the responsibility of identifying the likely
CDPUC REPORT, supra note 22, at 12 ("The Collaborative process . . . involves a certain degree of
preapproval.").
112. The Connecticut Business and Industry Association, for example, contends that its interests are
not currently being represented in certain collaboratives in Connecticut, but has no formal method for
gaining access to the negotiations. Pitblado Interview, supra note 23. See also HIRSH, supra note 32, at 30
("Industrial and commercial interests are noticeably missing from the collaborative processes in
Connecticut. All interested parties should have an opportunity to participate in the process.").
113. The most important mandatory party to each CPP is the regulatory commission itself. The other
mandatory parties will differ from state to state, and should be selected from the various state agencies
whose mandate is relevant to the issue of C&LM. The NRA requires the presence of a representative of
the lead agency when Reg-Neg is used. 5 U.S.C.A. § 585(b) (West Supp. 1992).
114. See Wayne V. Estey, Connecticut Dep't Pub. Util. Control, Draft Collaborative Process
Guidelines, [hereinafter Draft Guidelines] (on file with author).
115. RAAB & SCHWErizER, supra note 36, at 9.
116. 5. U.S.C.A. § 583(a) (West Supp. 1992). This task can be delegated to a specially appointed
convener. Id. § 583(b).
117. Id. § 584(a).
118. Id. § 584(b).
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participants. After appropriate publication, interested parties that are not located
by the commission should be given a chance to show that they deserve a place
at the negotiating table. Because collaboratives are ongoing, potential parties
should be able to make application to join at any time during the course of a
collaborative. To avoid disrupting negotiations, however, they should not be
granted voting status unless they join some reasonable period of time prior to
the finalizing of a stipulated agreement. Parties that join a collaborative too
late should be granted voting status once the stipulated agreement has been
completed and the collaborative has moved on to new matters.
An organizing statute that provides a clear and open method for parties to
gain access to the procedure would also be justified in creating a presumption
in favor of the CPP results in any subsequent commission proceedings." 9
Parties challenging the CPP results should bear the burden of demonstrating
to the commission that their interests were not adequately represented, and that
they had made a good-faith attempt to participate in the collaborative and were
unable to.'20 Similarly, if the commission proposed to alter the consensual
agreement, it should be required to explain in writing its reasons for
overcoming the presumption in favor of the collaborative results.
As a corollary to this presumption, the organizing statute for the CPP
could provide a mechanism for developing a cognizable record in the
collaboratives while maintaining the confidentiality that is essential to C&LM
development. For example, the Southern Connecticut Gas Company
Conservation Collaborative Procedural Guidelines require that minutes be kept
of every collaborative meeting. These minutes are circulated to each of the
participants for approval, and then filed with CDPUC.'2' The statute could
119. The mechanism of creating a presumption in favor of CPP results was suggested by
Commissioner Boucher. Boucher Interview, supra note 63.
120. Philip Harter suggests that rules developed through Reg-Neg should be reviewed by judges under
a permissive standard which would sustain a negotiated rule "to the extent that it is within the agency's
jurisdiction and actually reflects a consensus among the interested parties." See Harter, supra note 59, at
102-03. Parties challenging the rules would have to demonstrate that their interests had not been taken into
account. Judges would evaluate these parties' assertions in a manner similar to that currently used to
evaluate motions to intervene or challenges to the certification of class actions. If a judge determined that
the challenger's interests had not been represented, Harter would further require the challenger to
demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances excused its failure to raise its concerns in response to the
Federal Register notice announcing the formation of the negotiating group. Id. at 104-05.
Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit objected to Harter's suggestions because she was concerned that Reg-
Neg procedures did not provide sufficient guarantees of adequate representation. Wald, supra note 4, at 18-
25. If the procedural guarantees which I have suggested in my proposed organizing statute were in place,
see infra at app., some of Judge Wald's concerns might be addressed. In addition, unlike the short-term
Reg-Neg committees with which Judge Wald was familiar, collaboratives are ongoing. If a CPP group's
results are granted a presumption of validity, an unsuccessful challenger of the CPP results could petition
to join the collaborative at that time, an option not available to an unsuccessful challenger of a negotiated
rule. The worst result that the nonparticipant would face, therefore, is that the utility rate would not reflect
its concerns until the next stipulated agreement. Finally, since Reg-Neg is used for rules on a broad variety
of topics, there is a chance that affected parties will not have participated simply because they were
unaware that the negotiations were taking place. The CPP is only for the utility industry, and potential
participants are likely to know when negotiations occur.
121. Shimelman Letter, supra note 45, at app. 3.
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adopt this method for creating a decisional record for the CPP results, making
it clear that CPP participants were entitled to redact information on
confidentiality grounds. These minutes could be kept confidential to the extent
permitted by state and federal law,122 and could serve as a record in case the
CPP results were challenged either by the commission or by an intervenor.
A statute could help ensure that a strong conservation policy was reflected
in the CPP results by establishing policy goals to guide the negotiations.
12 3
The failure to address these goals would be grounds for rejection of the CPP
results, either by the commission or by the courts.
It is now left to regulatory commissions to decide whether collaboratives
place the appropriate emphasis on conservation. Many interviewees remarked
that the urgency with which utilities implement conservation measures is
highly dependent on whether the present commissioner is a strong advocate of
conservation. In areas in which they have expertise, commissioners are granted
wide discretion in the rate-setting process, 24 but there is no reason to allow
them discretion to emphasize or de-emphasize broad state policies.
Maine has enacted a statute providing that "[w]hen the available
alternatives [for meeting utility capacity requirements] are otherwise
equivalent, the commission shall give preference first to conservation and
demand management."' 2- This statute has been interpreted as imposing on
the Maine Public Utilities Commission a burden to explain, when it permits an
expansion of capacity, why it has not instead implemented conservation pro-
grams. 26 Imposing a similar duty on CPP participants would ensure that the
results of their negotiations conform to a conservation-oriented policy and
render the support of individual regulatory commissioners less necessary to the
success of conservation efforts.
It seems evident that such a policy statement would influence CPP
negotiations. At present, with no specific statement of the policies that should
underlie their negotiations, CPP participants are confronted with a vast array
of policies reflected in more general utility statutes and commission pronounce-
ments.' 27 Several CPP participants have requested more specific policy
122. Most statutes requiring disclosure of public records provide for exemptions which might apply
to the information that CPP parties were most concerned about keeping confidential. See, e.g., CON. GEN.
STAT. § 1-19(b) (1991) (exempting from disclosure, inter alia, trade secrets and engineering feasibility
statements).
123. In addition to protecting the public interest, this would aid negotiators. An initial, clear
enunciation of goals has been identified as essential to the success of the CPP. HIRSH, supra note 32, at
3.
124. See, e.g., Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564, 569 (1917) ("[Iln a question of rate-making there
is a strong presumption in favor of the conclusions reached by an experienced administrative body after
a full hearing.").
125. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3191 (West 1991).
126. See Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 589 A.2d 38, 41-43 (Me. Sup. Ct. 199 1).
127. See NUP Comments, supra note 34, at 3-4 (giving "partial" list of 17 potential sources of policy
guidance for CPP negotiations).
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guidance.'2' The statute could provide this guidance with a strong statement
of preference for conservation over capacity expansion.
b. Efficiency of the CPP
In addition to addressing the procedural and policy concerns discussed
above, the organizing statute could make the CPP more efficient. Collabor-
atives consume substantial resources. 129 Preparation for litigation occurs in
separate offices, whereas negotiation requires multiple face-to-face meetings,
which generate travel, lodging, and professional and clerical support
expenses.'
30
A statute could streamline the CPP by providing a standard format for new
collaboratives. At present, collaboratives begin in an ad hoc manner, each in
its own way. 13 ' This gives maximum flexibility, but each collaborative must
re-invent the wheel.13 Flexibility can be combined with formality if the
statute is permissive,133 establishing a series of default rules while allowing
the parties freedom to opt out of specific provisions.
The statute could also provide a mechanism for identifying appropriate
matters for the CPP.134 The NRA accomplishes this by providing a list of
issue characteristics indicating appropriateness for Reg-Neg, which the
convener consults before going forward with the process. 35 The organizing
statute for the CPP should adopt this procedure. In addition, the statute should
require the commission to state, before convening a collaborative, that it
128. See Shimelman Letter, supra note 45; Ranger Letter, supra note 86; Consolidated Gas Utility
Comments, supra note 45.
129. See, e.g., RAAB & SCHWErrZER, supra note 36, at 43-45.
130. PERRrIT, supra note 61, at 33.
131. For a comprehensive review of the various ways that collaboratives are initiated, see RAAB &
SCHWEITZER, supra note 36, at 9-10.
132. The Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, a participant in all Connecticut collaboratives,
claims that establishing procedural guidelines has consumed substantial amounts of time at the beginning
of new collaboratives. Shimelman Letter, supra note 45. Cf. Breger Statement, supra note 79, at 25
("Variations in procedure each time ... an agency [uses] negotiated rulemaking can be confusing to agency
officials and to the public. In addition, the practice of 'reinventing the wheel' is not likely to make use of
the best information available on utilizing reg-neg procedures.").
133. In this more "practical" area, the statute should be permissive. In addressing the earlier concerns,
such as establishing policy directives and allowing for party participation, the statute should be mandatory.
Cf. Breger Statement, supra note 79, at 24 (arguing that NRA should include a core of procedural elements
to protect and inform the public, along with flexible practical measures).
134. Raab and Schweitzer feel that determining beforehand the appropriateness of issues is one of the
most important ways to reduce the costs of the CPP. RAAB & SCHWErrzER, supra note 36, at 44. When
parties are truly far apart on core issues, attempts to negotiate can simply highlight differences and cause
animosity. On the other hand, even if no ultimate consensus is reached, attempting the collaborative process
can define the issues and separate those that can be decided collaboratively from those that cannot. HiRSH,
supra note 32, at 4.
135. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 583 (West Supp. 1992). This facet of the statute is already being used to great
effect by various federal agencies. See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 10,621 (1992).
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intends to use the CPP agreement as the basis for the approved conservation
budget, to the extent permitted by its statutory duties.
1 36
A statute could fix the definitions of terms, such as "consensus,' '137 the
interest rate for capital, 138 or "cost effectiveness,"' 139 thereby removing them
from time-consuming debate. The statute could also assign responsibility for
scheduling collaboratives involving different utilities in an integrated way,
allowing the utilities sufficient time to plan and implement projects
effectively. 140
Nearly all of the interviewees agreed upon the need for a method to keep
the CPP moving. The NRA requires an agency to publish "a proposed agenda
and schedule for completing the work of the committee."' 4' This plan should
be adopted for the CPP. In addition, the commission should be empowered to
issue orders imposing sanctions on the utility if it does not participate in good
faith, or terminating the collaborative if the commission finds that its
continuance is not in the public interest.
Increased costs burden parties unequally, and a statute could standardize
the provision of funds for the less-wealthy participants. The NRA empowers
the agency to pay directly for the personal expenses of committee members
and reasonable costs for obtaining technical assistance, 42 and also to provide
technical and other support directly to the participants.' 43 A similar plan
would work for the CPP. The technical assistance could be paid for through
a fund created by payments from the utilities. The size of the payments could
be fixed by the commission, and could be directly recoverable by the utilities
136. Cf. 5 U.S.C.A. §583 (West Supp. 1992) ("An agency may establish a negotiated rulemaking
committee ... [if] the agency, to the maximum extent possible consistent with the legal obligations of the
agency, will use the consensus of the committee ... as the basis for the proposed rule ....").
137. The NRA provides that: "'consensus' means unanimous concurrence among the interests
represented on a negotiated rulemaking committee established under this subchapter, unless such
committee- (A) agrees to define such term to mean a general but not unanimous concurrence; or (B)
agrees upon another specified definition." 5 U.S.C.A. § 582(2) (West Supp. 1992).
138. While it is generally thought that the cost of money for conservation efforts should be lower than
that for capacity expansion, reflecting a lower risk and fewer externalities, the actual rates are now
determined by negotiation. United Illuminating, for example, uses a standard 25% inflator to the benefit
side for conservation methods and has suggested that this be institutionalized. Southern Connecticut Gas,
on the other hand, uses an adder of 1.58/MMBTU to the cost side for capacity expansion, reflecting the
costs associated with the pollution that power generation creates. CDPUC REPORT, supra note 22, at 22.
139. Currently there is no uniformity among collaboratives in the definition of cost-effectiveness.
Connecticut Light and Power has suggested that the Total Resource Test be adopted as the standard test
for cost effectiveness. Connecticut Light & Power Company, Summary of Comments to Collaborative
Process Guidelines (1991) in Notice of Comments & Comments, supra note 34. Conservation proposals
in the Yankeegas CPP must pass the "utility test," which means that they must reduce revenue
requirements. Consolidated Gas Utility Comments, supra note 45.
140. What Cavanagh describes a 'worst of all worlds' scenario" occurs when one group of utility
capacity planners are planning for expansion based on current demand forecasts while a separate group is
planning and implementing conservation measures that will drastically lower that demand. Cavanagh, supra
note 15, at 327. Careful scheduling of collaboratives could help to avoid this.
141. 5 U.S.C.A. § 584(a)(5) (West Supp. 1992).
142. Id. § 588(c).
143. Id. § 585(c).
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as standard expenses. Potential CPP participants should be able to gain access
to the funds after showing that they did not have adequate financial resources
to participate in the CPP, and that their participation was necessary to protect
the public interest."'
This plan would equalize the relative influence of the utilities and the
NUP's by ending NUP dependence on utility funding, and would also reduce
the danger of co-option of the NUP's by the utilities that provide for their
employment. In addition, it would spread the cost of financing the NUP's
among the members of the public that they served, thereby allocating those
costs most appropriately, and providing an impetus for the public to scrutinize
the NUP's' performance.
Finally, it should be remembered that it is not cost alone that is relevant
to determining the value of the CPP, but rather, the relation of costs to
improvements in regulatory products. Even if a statute could not entirely
equalize the costs of the CPP and litigation, some increase in costs may be
justified if the products of the CPP are proportionately superior. 45
CONCLUSION
The CPP has had admirable success in adapting the principles of ADR to
the problem of utility C&LM, but it does not provide adequately for
participation by all interested parties. In addition, it does not provide a
mechanism for ensuring that the public interest-not just the interests of the
participating negotiators-is taken into account. Regulatory commissions
should not continue to condone the use of the CPP unless these problems are
addressed.
The most effective way to address these problems would be through the
passage of an organizing statute that established a fair method for gaining
access to the process, outlined the participants' procedural rights and
144. This arrangement would fall within the scope of the procedures outlined for state utility regulatory
procedures in the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1989) (PURPA).
This act was passed by Congress to encourage energy conservation and to provide equitable rates for
electric consumers. See Lori A. Burkhart, Intervenor Funding in Utility Proceedings, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
June 7, 1990, at 37, 37. Under PURPA, intervenors in state utility regulatory proceedings must be able to
recover reasonable expenses if they substantially contribute to the result in the proceeding. 16 U.S.C.
§2632(a) (1989). States may follow procedures different from those outlined in this section if they provide
"an alternative means for providing adequate compensation to persons (1) who have, or represent, an
interest (A) which would not otherwise be adequately represented in the proceeding, and (B) representation
of which is necessary for a fair determination in the proceeding, and (2) who are, or represent an interest
which is, unable to effectively participate or intervene in the proceeding because such persons cannot afford
to pay reasonable attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and other reasonable costs .. " 16 U.S.C. § 2632(b)
(1989). As signatories to the stipulated agreement, participants presumptively affect the result of the
proceeding considering that filing. Providing funding to these participants, therefore, could qualify as an
"alternative means" contemplated by PURPA.
145. Many of the CPP participants interviewed by Raab and Schweitzer, in fact, felt that the question
of cost was irrelevant, given the consensus that the CPP produced superior regulatory products. RAAB &
SCiWEITZER, supra note 36, at 45.
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responsibilities, and stipulated policy goals that would limit the scope of the
private negotiations. In addition to addressing concerns about the CPP's
legitimacy, this statute could include measures to increase the CPP's efficiency.
The states that have chosen to endorse the CPP, and the parties that have
been involved in its development, should now complete the task by providing
the CPP with procedural integrity. If they can do so they will answer the needs
of the CPP and, more importantly, the needs of the policy of energy
conservation that gave it birth.
APPENDIX: PROPOSED ORGANIZING STATUTE FOR THE CPP
An act to facilitate the use of the collaborative planning process by regulated utilities:
46
SECTION 1: Findings
The Legislature finds that it is in the best interests of the State to ensure that its regulated
utilities pursue a long-range plan to increase, to the greatest extent reasonably possible,
implementation of energy conservation measures. The Legislature further finds that:
(a) utility conservation and load management budgets and programs (C&LM) are
often established in adversarial ratemaking procedures that may discourage the affected
parties from meeting and communicating with each other, and may cause parties with
different interests to assume conflicting and antagonistic positions and to engage in
expensive and time-consuming litigation;
(b) planning C&LM in adversarial rate cases deprives the affected parties and the
public of the benefits of face-to-face negotiations and cooperation in developing and
reaching agreement. It also deprives them of the benefits of shared information,
knowledge, expertise, and technical abilities possessed by the affected parties;
(c) the Collaborative Planning Process (CPP), in which interested parties participate
in the development of C&LM, can provide significant advantages over adversarial rate
cases;
(d) the CPP can increase the acceptability and improve the substance of C&LM,
making it less likely that the affected parties will resist implementation of C&LM
measures or challenge such measures in court.
146. This proposed act was modeled on the following sources: The Negotiated Rulemaldng Act of
1990, 104 Stat. 4969, 4970-77; ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A § 3191 (1991); Notice of Comments &
Comments, supra note 34, CL&P Memorandum, supra note 35; Draft Guidelines, supra note 114; SCGC
Guidelines, supra note 35; U.I. Agreement, supra note 39; comments of Nancy Pitblado, Planning Analyst,
Connecticut Office of Policy and Management; comments of Wayne V. Estey, Senior Economist,
Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control; comments of Douglas L. Boulivar, Visiting Lecturer,
Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.; I bear full responsibility, however, for several individual provisions of




The purpose of this statute is to establish a framework for the conduct of the CPP,
and to encourage the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to use the CPP when the process
would enhance C&LM development. Nothing in this statute should be construed as an
attempt to limit innovation and experimentation within the CPP or with other innovative
ratemaking procedures otherwise authorized by law.
SECTION 3: Definitions
47
For the purposes of this statute, the term-
(a) "collaborative" means a group assembled for the purpose of developing C&LM
proposals through the use of the CPP;
(b) "consensus" means unanimous concurrence among the interests represented in a
collaborative, unless such collaborative agrees upon another specified definition;
(c) "C&LM proposal" means any proposal regarding any portion of a utility budget
allocated for C&LM, or regarding any substantive C&LM project or design.
SECTION 4: Determination of advisability of convening a collaborative
The PUC may establish a collaborative if it determines that the use of the CPP is in
the public interest. In making such a determination, the PUC shall consider whether-
(a) a utility within the jurisdiction of the PUC is currently engaged in any stage of
planning, implementation, oversight, or evaluation of any portion of its budget or
programs for C&LM;
(b) there is a reasonable likelihood that a collaborative can be convened with a
balanced representation of persons who-
(1) can adequately represent the interests likely to be significantly affected by the
adoption of such utility's C&LM proposals;
(2) are willing to negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus on the C&LM
proposals; and
(3) the PUC, to the maximum extent possible consistent with its legal obligations,
will use the consensus of the collaborative with respect to the C&LM proposals as the
basis for the final C&LM budget approved for such utility.
147. This Note suggests that the organizing statute should define several of the terms which are
currently defined by collaboratives through negotiation. See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
The actual definitions chosen for these terms, however, will depend on the needs and circumstances of the
particular state and of that state's utilities. I have, therefore, included only a representative sample of the
type of definitions that might be appropriate for an organizing statute for the CPP.
19931 1259
The Yale Law Journal
SECTION 5: Publication of notice; applications for inclusion in collaborative
(a) If the PUC decides to establish a collaborative, the PUC shall publish in the
state's official publication 48 and, as appropriate, in trade or other specialized
publications, a notice which shall include-
(1) an announcement that the PUC intends to establish a collaborative to negotiate
and develop C&LM proposals;
(2) a description of the subject and scope of the proposals to be developed, and the
issues to be considered;
(3) a list of the interests which are likely to be significantly affected by the
proposals;
(4) a list of the persons proposed to represent such interests and the person or
persons proposed to represent the PUC;
(5) a proposed agenda and schedule for submission of proposals to the PUC for
approval;
(6) a description of support for the collaborative to be provided by the PUC,
including technical assistance; and
(7) an explanation of how a person may apply or nominate another person for
membership in the collaborative, as provided under subsection (b).
(b) Applications for membership in collaborative
(1) Persons who will be significantly affected by the C&LM proposals and who
believe that their interests will not be adequately represented by any person specified in
a notice published pursuant to subsection (a) of this section may apply for, or nominate
another person for, membership in the collaborative to represent such interests. Each
application or nomination shall include-
(A) a written commitment that the applicant or nominee shall actively
participate in good faith in the development of the proposals under
consideration; and
(B) the reasons that the persons specified in the notice published pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section do not adequately represent the interests of the
person submitting the application or nomination.
(c) Individuals may make application for membership according to the procedures
referred to in subsection (b) of this section at the time that a collaborative is convened,
or at any time during the course of an ongoing collaborative. Parties accepted for
membership in a collaborative less than five months prior to the date that a stipulated
agreement is scheduled to be completed by that collaborative pursuant to subsection 7(f)
of this statute shall be granted voting status within the collaborative immediately
following the completion of that agreement.
148. This publication should be made in whichever medium or forum the particular state places its
official notices analogous to those published by the federal government in the Federal Register.
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SECTION 6: Establishment of collaborative
(a) The PUC shall limit membership in a collaborative to 15 members, unless the
PUC determines that a greater number of members is necessary for the functioning of the
collaborative or to achieve balanced membership.
(b) The PUC shall provide appropriate administrative support to all collaboratives,
including technical assistance. The PUC may use for this purpose the services and
facilities of other state agencies and public and private agencies and instrumentalities with
the consent of such agencies and instrumentalities. In addition, the PUC shall provide
reasonable funding for collaborative participants to contract with firms or individuals of
their choice for the purpose of obtaining technical information and support as provided
in subsection (c) of this section.
(c) The PUC may pay for a member's expenses incurred in contracting with private
firms or individuals of their own choice to obtain technical information and support if-
(1) such member certifies a lack of adequate financial resources to obtain the
technical information necessary to effectively participate in the collaborative; and
(2) the PUC determines that such member's participation in the CPP is necessary to
protect the public interest.
(d) All administrative support and/or funding provided pursuant to this section shall
be financed through annual payments made by each utility under the jurisdiction of the
PUC. The amount of such payments shall be determined by the PUC, and any payments
made by utilities under this provision shall be reimbursed to the utilities as standard
expenses.
(e) The PUC is authorized to provide training in negotiation to CPP participants.
SECTION 7: Conduct of collaborative
(a) Each collaborative established pursuant to this statute shall analyze the potential
for direct investment by the utility in demand-side management resources; shall design
programs and/or procedures to harness that potential on a comprehensive basis; and shall
design plans to facilitate the implementation of such programs and/or procedures to the
full extent that they are cost-effective.
(b) When the available alternatives are otherwise equivalent, the utility shall give
preference to conservation and demand management over expansion of energy-generating
capacity. Any forecasted new capacity expansion identified in annual forecasts of the
participating utility shall be compared to C&LM by the collaborative, to determine
whether conservation or demand-side management measures could serve as an alternative
to the capacity expansion.
(c) The PUC will designate at least one representative to be present at all meetings
of the collaborative. This representative can give guidance regarding PUC policy, but his
or her primary purpose will be to observe the process and to facilitate consensus
development. PUC Staff involvement does not imply that actions taken at the meetings,
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statements in the minutes of the meetings, or programs recommended by the group are
approved by the PUC.
(d) The collaborative participants shall select by consensus a person to serve as
facilitator. A person designated to represent the PUC in substantive issues may not serve
as facilitator or otherwise chair the collaborative.
(e) A facilitator approved or selected by a collaborative shall-
(I) chair the meetings of the collaborative in an impartial manner
(2) impartially assist the members of the collaborative in conducting discussions and
negotiations; and
(3) manage the keeping of minutes and records of the collaborative, except that any
personal notes and materials of the facilitator or of the members of a collaborative shall
be exempt from disclosure under any law, state or federal, to the extent permitted by the
state and federal constitutions. Within a reasonable time following each meeting of the
collaborative, the facilitator shall deliver a copy of the minutes of that meeting to a
designated representative of each CPP participant. Within one week of the receipt of such
minutes, such designated representative may request the facilitator to redact any
information that the party requesting redaction supplied, unilaterally, to the collaborative
for use in its negotiations. All such requests for redaction shall be honored by the
facilitator. In addition, if any designated representative disagrees with either the substance
or the tone of any portion of the minutes that is not subject to that representative's
redaction, that representative may supply an alternative written version of that portion,
which shall be added to the minutes as an appendix. The facilitator shall not change the
wording of the minutes in any other way without the unanimous consent of all parties to
the collaborative. When all collaborative participants have indicated their approval of the
minutes, such minutes shall be transmitted to the PUC for placement in their confidential
files. Such minutes may be used by any collaborative participant for any reason only with
the unanimous concurrence of all collaborative participants who have agreed not to
challenge the collaborative's results.
(f) If a collaborative reaches a consensus on C&LM proposals, it shall record that
consensus in a stipulated agreement signed by all parties. The signatories to any such
agreement shall not challenge any proposal contained in that agreement in any subsequent
proceeding, provided that the agreement is approved, without alteration, by the PUC. The
participating utility shall transmit to the PUC a filing containing the proposals adopted
in the stipulated agreement. If the collaborative does not reach a consensus on C&LM
proposals, the participating utility may transmit to the PUC a filing specifying any areas
in which the collaborative reached a consensus. It will remain the responsibility of the
participating utility to seek PUC approval of the proposals contained in the filing,
according to its statutory responsibilities. Submission of a filing to the PUC shall not
terminate the collaborative.
(1) The PUC shall supply a written statement of the reasons for the rejection of any
proposals adopted by unanimous consensus in a collaborative, including, where relevant,
the reasons for overcoming the presumption in favor of conservation described in
subsection 7(b) of this section. Before the PUC makes a determination to reject any
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proposal adopted by unanimous consensus in a collaborative, the collaborative participants
shall be afforded a hearing on all relevant evidence, including any minutes of
collaborative meetings on file at the PUC that have been properly approved for use by
the collaborative participants pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, to contest the
rejection of those proposals.
(2) All prior statutory rights of intervention into the proceedings of the PUC are
preserved. Any individual challenging a proposal adopted by unanimous consensus in a
collaborative, however, shall demonstrate to the PUC that their interests were not
considered in the collaborative, that they were unable to participate in the collaborative,
and their interests could not be fairly addressed by commencing participation in the
collaborative at that time.
SECTION 8: Sanctions, Termination of collaborative
(a) The PUC may issue an order imposing sanctions on the utility for failing to
cooperate in good faith with the negotiation efforts of a collaborative. The PUC may also
issue an order terminating any collaborative whenever the PUC finds that the continuation
of that collaborative is not in the public interest. During the time that such order is in
effect, non-PUC parties to the former collaborative shall not be prevented from holding
meetings. However, no representative of the PUC shall attend any such meetings, no
parties to the former collaborative shall be eligible for reimbursement of funds under
subsection 6(c) of this statute, and any results of negotiations conducted by the former
collaborative participants shall not be subject to the requirements of Section 7 of this
statute. The decision to issue an order terminating a collaborative shall be appealable to
a court of general jurisdiction of this state.
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